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Perceptions of water as an increasingly scarce resource have gained 
global dominance, and caused many countries to reform their water 
legislations. South Africa has positioned itself in the vanguard of 
such reform efforts, as it passed the National Water Act in 1998, four 
years after the end of apartheid. The Act was lauded as a progressive 
piece of policy, with the redress of past injustices as one of its 
overarching aims. But, to date, there has been little progress in 
terms of redistribution of water use rights. This paper argues that 
bringing water under the ambit of the State, in combination with the 
particular political conjunctures in post-apartheid South Africa, 
opened up space for the emergence of particular narratives around 
water use rights that framed the continued use of existing users as 
pivotal for sustainability, and redistribution to ‘historically 
disadvantaged individuals’ as associated with a high degree of risk. 
These framings of sustainability contrasted with more complex and 
dynamic framings at the regional and local levels. Though water 
allocation reform is essentially a deeply political issue, the increasing 
technocratisation of the reform process served to mask contested 
understandings, through e.g. the use of innocuous-sounding terms 
such as ‘existing lawful use’. Through an analysis of the allocation 
discourses emerging at the national level and a case study of 
Inkomati Water Management Area, this paper argues that the 
entrenchment of existing users in the interests of ‘sustainability’, the 
increasing technocratic approach to redistribution, and the social 
dynamics and discourses at the regional and local levels narrowed 
down the room for manoeuvre, resulting in the water allocation 
reform ending in a temporary impasse. 
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Water, crucial for human survival, is an inherently dynamic resource, an ephemeral 
substance that cannot be exclusively possessed. The increasing recognition of 
water as a truly vital substance for which demand is spiralling has resulted in 
scenarios of scarcity and tales of ‘the looming water crisis’ becoming staple fare 
at international conferences and gatherings. Numerous efforts at quantifying 
how much water is actually available have produced ‘water poverty’ indices that 
provide numerical estimates of the amount of water present in a given country 
(Lawrence et al. 2002; Falkenmark and Widstrand 1992). Though attention has 
largely been focussed on the physical aspects of water scarcity, recent research 
(see e.g. Mehta 2005a; 2005b) has questioned these assumptions, highlighting 
the fact that the water issue is not only about physical availability, but involves 
social, political and distributional issues (UNEP 2006). 
The increasing perceptions of water scarcity have prompted many countries to 
engage in reforming their water legislations and systems of water use rights. 
The dominant discourse of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
has been highly influential on such reform efforts. It promotes the devolution of 
decision-making power to the lowest possible level (the principle of subsidiarity) 
and argues the case for market-oriented solutions to allocating water resources, 
whilst simultaneously advocating holistic and integrated management that 
necessitates greater bureaucracy and centralisation (Biswas 2004). As a 
consequence of the latter aspect, water resources have increasingly been brought 
under the ambit of the State through the imposition of administrative water use 
rights such as licences (Burchi 2004). The rationale for instituting such rights is 
often to facilitate more efficient allocation. Questions that emerge in this respect 
include: how do such reform efforts play out in practice? How are use rights 
and allocation mechanisms conceptualised at policy level, and how do different 
understandings of sustainability manifest themselves? What role is played 
by science and technology in facilitating reform? South Africa, in the vanguard 
of global reform efforts and unique in its emphasis on equity, provides an 
interesting example to explore.  
The paper will argue that vesting the State with the discretionary power of 
determining use rights led to the emergence of ‘allocation discourses’ that were 
also deeply influenced by the particular political context in post-apartheid South 
Africa.  The overriding notion of achieving equity was subsumed by framings 
of socio-ecological-technological dynamics that represented redistribution 
as a potential environmental risk, and presented the continued use of already 
privileged users as vital to sustain South Africa’s economy. Furthermore, the 
increasing technocratisation of the policy process, the failure to deal with local 
dynamics, and the inability to determine the extent of existing users contributed 
to leading the reform efforts into an impasse. 
2The paper is organised as follows: it first sets the scene in terms of the South 
African political context, then goes on to describe the water legislation and 
policy in brief, highlighting how particular allocation discourses emerged during 
the policy-making process. It proceeds to examine what happened in the case 
of the Inkomati Water Management Area (WMA), one of the pilot regions of 
reform efforts, before discussing ways in which the reform process can be 
understood, and drawing out the wider implications for water reform in South 
Africa and elsewhere. 
3THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF POST-
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa’s bloodless transformation in 1994 from an oppressive apartheid 
state to a multiracial democracy was hailed as nothing short of a miracle (Sparks 
2003a), but 300 years of turbulent history takes time to remedy. The historical 
trajectory resulted in South Africa becoming a country of ‘plenty amidst poverty’ 
(Nattrass 1983: 12, quoted in May 2000: 16), with staggering levels of inequality. 
This legacy of inequality can be traced back to the early history of colonial 
conquest by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, followed by the British in the 
early eighteenth century. The exploitative nature of colonisation deepened and 
hardened in the modern era, through more than 40 years of segregationist and 
deeply repressive policies under the apartheid regime, and apartheid’s ideology 
of separating peoples according to their skin hues left indelible marks on the 
South African national psyche. The ending of apartheid with the transition to 
democracy in 1994 saw the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the country’s 
elected president, and placed the leader of the liberation struggle, the African 
National Congress (ANC), firmly in the corridors of power. A new era had begun. 
The Constitution of 1996 enshrined equality and respect as cornerstones of 
the fledgling ‘Rainbow Nation’, and reforming the country’s various legislations, 
particularly those governing land and access to natural resources, became a key 
concern for the new Government. Water, perceived as a scarce resource that 
was very unequally distributed, was high on the agenda, and was one of the first 
legislations to be overhauled and aligned with the principles of the Constitution.
THE IMPACTS OF THE NEGOTIATED 
SETTLEMENT: GETTING INTO GEAR
The ANC’s election manifesto, the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), was a piece of development policy with socialist resonance aimed at 
redressing past inequities through socio-economic and institutional reform, 
including educational and cultural programmes, employment generation and 
human resources development (Villa-Vicencio and Ngesi 2003). Key to the RDP 
was the emphasis on basic service provision and the view that the State needed 
to be restructured in order to facilitate a more equitable distribution of resources 
and deal with the socio-spatial distortions of the apartheid era (Maharaj and 
Ramutsindela 2002; see also Bond and Khoza 1999). 
4However, this initial socially-oriented policy was relatively quickly subsumed by 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR) in the initial years of 
Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki’s, reign. GEAR was a macroeconomic strategy 
that emphasised liberalism, deregulation and giving a loose rein to market forces 
with a concomitantly reduced role for the Government (Villa-Vicencio and Ngesi 
2003), and was ‘blatantly misrepresented as the concrete form of the ditched 
and more ambitious and progressive RDP’ (Fine 2003: 571). This marked turn in 
policy generated considerable controversy, and presented a government facing 
budgetary constraints and social pressures with the major dilemma of reconciling 
a ‘social, rights-based, gap-filling and developmental approach with an approach 
based on productivity and efficiency’ (Perret 2002). 
But how and why did this happen so fast? One would have expected an organisation 
that played such a pivotal role in the anti-apartheid struggle – that was the anti-
apartheid struggle – not to have succumbed so easily to the flawed logic of the 
Washington consensus. Instead, the nature of the ’negotiated settlement’, where 
the ANC was thought to reach a compromise with powerful economic interests 
in order to secure political power, paved the way for the rise of the neoliberal 
paradigm in much of post-apartheid politics. The irony, according to Fine, was 
that the ANC ‘discovered neo-liberalism just as it was at its most extreme and its 
most vulnerable, in light of theoretical, empirical and policy failings’ (Fine 2003: 
572, emphasis in original). It is ironic that the political capital built up by the ANC 
during the liberation struggle is now being spent to enforce neo-liberal structural 
reforms. (Carmody 2002; see also Bond 2004; 2000). According to Carmody 
(ibid: 260, footnote omitted):
…the negotiated nature of the settlement meant the basic maintenance 
of the previous economic system, including respect for private property 
‘rights’. Thus, rather than enforcing redistribution and resource mobilisation 
internally, ‘industrialisation by invitation’ - drawing capital from overseas - 
became an attractive strategy for the South African state.
Thus, though the new Constitution (Government of South Africa 1996) was 
lauded for leading on social issues – e.g. recognising access to drinking water 
as a human right – it also protected existing property rights through section 25, 
or what became known as the ‘property clause’, in the interests of economic 
growth.
5BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT, 
AND THE NOTION OF TWO ECONOMIES
In terms of redressing the inequities of the past, Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) became a buzzword in the post-apartheid political atmosphere. In the RDP, 
the notion of BEE was initially conceived of as a means to facilitate redistribution of 
productive resources to those groups that had been oppressed and disadvantaged 
under the apartheid regime. However, the notion of BEE over time evolved 
into a process of affirmative action that provided black individuals, rather than 
groups, enhanced opportunities (e.g. through the preferential granting of shares). 
It became more concerned with how black people could access the returns of 
higher economic growth rates, than with real redistribution of productive assets 
(Ponte et al. 2007). This rendered the BEE initiative vulnerable to criticism that it 
was enriching a small black elite, and prompted the Government into launching a 
second phase of BEE, redubbed ‘Broad-Based’ Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE), to emphasise the intended broadly inclusive approach and to make 
its policies more palatable to the ranks of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Some 
observers hold that the BBBEE is an attempt at legitimating the Government’s 
neoliberal policies through facilitating the establishment of a black capitalist class, 
which in turn guarantees the survival of the white capitalists and their property 
rights (see e. g. Malikane and Ndletyana 2006, cited in ibid: 934). Others argue 
that fostering a black capitalist class would provide a feasible route to achieving 
the much vaunted ‘trickle-down effect’. Hence, the BBBEE approach contains 
contradictory objectives. Corporations often interpret BBBEE charters in purely 
managerialist terms, which has laid them open to charges that BBBEE is merely 
implemented to provide a route to acquiring legitimacy (Hamann et al. 2008). 
Pervading these issues is the ubiquitous tendency to describe South Africa’s 
socio-economic condition using the metaphor of ‘two economies’ (Bond 2007; Du 
Toit and Neves 2007; Cousins 2007). This metaphor construes the South African 
situation as comprising two isolated economic realms that exist in disconnected 
parallel, the realm of ‘traditionalist’ modes of production and sustenance, and the 
realm of modernised, industrialised production. In agricultural terms, subsistence 
agricultural production is pitted against the modern agricultural sector, where 
modernising is equal to consolidation and commercialisation of farming activities. 
The gist of the ‘two economies’ discourse is that those ‘stuck in the backwaters’ 
need to be given a route of access into the ‘first economy’.  
Having laid out the main characteristics of the political situation in South Africa, 
the next section deals with how the water act and ensuing water allocation reform 
aligned with these debates.
6THE NATIONAL WATER ACT 1998 
During apartheid, there were huge inequalities between blacks and whites with 
regard to access to such natural resources as land and water. The predominantly 
White Republic of South Africa (RSA) created reserves that came to be known 
as ‘Homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’ for black people, thus depriving them of both 
freehold title and dignity (Villa-Vicencio and Ngesi 2003; Van Koppen et al. 
2002). The inequalities still prevail, reflecting the extent of overcrowding and land 
deprivation resulting from the apartheid policy. Some progress is being made in 
terms of land redistribution, but it is painfully slow (Lahiff 2008). There are even 
greater inequalities in access to water. As much as 95 per cent of irrigation water 
is consumed by predominantly white, large-scale farmers, with the remaining 5 
per cent accessible to smallholders, mainly blacks (Cullis and Van Koppen 2007; 
Schreiner and Van Koppen 2002). 
In 1998, South Africa ratified one of the most sophisticated and progressive 
Water Acts in the world, the National Water Act no. 36 (Government of South 
Africa 1998), which explicitly emphasises equity as being the primary objective 
for instituting a water use rights reform. 
The Act introduces a novel concept, that of the Reserve, which refers to both 
an ecological reserve1 in terms of retaining a minimum level of instream flow to 
ensure ecosystem sustainability, and that of a human reserve, which refers to the 
quantities of water necessary to meet basic human needs. Over and above the 
Reserve, the Act categorises water uses into Schedule One uses, which includes 
water used for domestic purposes such as drinking, washing, watering livestock 
and homegardening; General Authorisations (non-transferable), which covers 
water uses in specific geographical areas or for particular purposes that are 
deemed to have a low impact; Existing Lawful Uses (ELUs) which refers to uses 
that were actively taking place within two years of the new Act being promulgated 
and which were recognised as lawful under the previous legislation; and finally 
water use licences, which covers all other uses. All water use, bar Schedule 
One, needs to be registered in a national database, the Water Authorisation 
and Registration Management System (WARMS). What constitutes ‘use’ is also 
defined in terms of the nature of the use, and divided into 11 categories, including 
1 In the NWA, the whole of chapter 3 is devoted to protection of water resources and deals 
with the development of a classification system for water resources and resource quality 
objectives, determination of the Reserve, and pollution prevention. Hadley Kavin, the lawyer 
and member of the Water Law Drafting Team, emphasised the importance of the technical 
aspects, and that the ‘hijacking’ of the process by environmentalists had profound technical 
implications – he was primarily worried about the feasibility of the ecological criteria.‘(…) we 
are now ten years down the line, and I haven’t seen a draft of the regulations yet’ (interview, 
10 August 2006).
7taking water from a water resource, storing water, impeding or diverting the flow 
of water in a watercourse, and engaging in stream flow reduction activities. 
In the National Water Act (NWA), licences were conceived in terms of facilitating 
reallocation of water resources through the process of compulsory licensing 
in which all water uses in a stressed basin would be cancelled and new uses 
issued licences according to the criteria of equity and efficiency set out in the 
Act (section 27.1b).2 Basically, compulsory licensing is a mechanism whereby 
all the water uses in a specific area are cancelled, and a call for licences issued; 
and will primarily be used in areas where there is considered to be water stress, 
which was considered to be the case for 11 out of the 19 WMAs (Director: Water 
Utilisation, interview 15 August 2006). 
In terms of management, the country was partitioned into 19 WMAs, based more 
or less on drainage regions, that were be governed by a Catchment Management 
Agency (CMA). The purpose of the CMA was first and foremost outlined as ‘co-
ordinating and promoting public participation in water management’ (Anderson 
2005: 1; see also Brown 2005), though it was envisaged that these responsibilities 
could be expanded to include setting and collecting water use charges and 
issuing water use licences (Schreiner and Van Koppen 2002). Moreover, the 
NWA outlines the development of a National Water Resources Strategy as the 
overarching instrument for managing national water resources. Its purpose is to 
‘set out the strategies, objectives, plans guidelines and procedures of the Minister 
and institutional arrangements relating to the protection, use, development, 
conservation, management and control of water resources’ (DWAF 2004: 8). 
The NWA represented a significant departure from the previous 1912 Irrigation 
Act and the 1956 Water Act that both rested on the principle of riparianism. 
Riparianism essentially held that only those owning land adjacent to rivers – 
riparian land – were entitled to use water ‘reasonably’. Water use rights were 
therefore dependent on land ownership, and all landowners along a stretch 
of river would have to cooperate to ensure that no one infringed on another’s 
2 27. (1) In issuing a general authorisation or licence a responsible authority must take into 
account all relevantfactors, including -
(a) existing lawful water uses;
(b) the need to redress the results of past racial and gender discrimination;
(c) efficient and beneficial use of water in the public interest; 
(d) the socio-economic impact. (….)
Moreover, according to the NWA section 43(1), undertaking compulsory licensing should be 
considered in order to:  
(a) Achieve a fair allocation of water from a water resource which is under water stress, or 
when it is necessary to review prevailing water use to achieve equity of allocation 
(b) Promote beneficial use of water in the public interest 
(c) Facilitate efficient management of the water resource
(d) Protect water resource quality
8ability to enjoy his or her entitlement to reasonable use of water. Riparianism 
was essentially a ‘closed commons’; each individual’s use right being in principle 
correlative to the use of others (Backeberg 2005; Tisdell 2003; Rose 1994). 
The problem was, of course, that this was an elite closed commons, comprised 
of people that had access to land, which through the passing of the notorious 
1913 Land Act had been an asset almost entirely reserved for South Africa’s 
white minority. 
9THE WATER ALLOCATION REFORM: EMERGING 
NARRATIVES OF EQUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY
The passing of the 1998 Act vested the State with the authority of issuing licences, 
and the earlier system of user-user correlative rights was transformed into a 
relation of state-user administrative rights (Movik 2008). This shift in relations 
meant that the State gained a large degree of discretionary power in terms of 
making decisions on how, and to whom, to allocate water, rather than water 
use rights deriving from a legal principle such as the riparian doctrine (Burger 
2006). This implied that the way use rights and potential users were conceived 
would be open to particular framings at the policy level (Fischer 2003; Rein and 
Schön 1993), creating space for contestations and ambiguity. ‘Framing’ in this 
context refers to the way notions of sustainability and equity were understood, 
in particular how different characteristics of social, ecological and technological 
system interaction and functionings were highlighted and others downplayed, 
effectively shaping the nature of use rights themselves (Movik 2008). Scoones et 
al. (2007) argue that the term ‘sustainability’ is not only an objective concept that 
refers to a system’s ability to maintain its structures and functionings in the face 
of short-term or long-term disturbance - it is also a normative concept open to 
particular framings, as different people will emphasise different system functions 
as being of more importance than others. They distinguish these two dimensions 
of sustainability through referring to normative Sustainability with a capital S - 
Sustainability, then, refers to the particular goals that are identified by different 
actors, and these goals are inherently value-laden and political, reflected in the 
particular framings that emerge in policy discourse. I will argue in the following 
that particular notions of Sustainability were allowed to dominate through the 
emergence of privileged accounts, which emphasised particular features whilst 
downplaying others. 
On the face of it, the main driving force for the implementation of administrative 
licences was that it facilitated the reallocation of water from the haves to the have-
nots (former Minister of Water Affairs Buyelwa Sonjica speech, 4 May 2006). But 
even though the NWA contained the core principles of reallocation, it did not spell 
out in detail how redistribution should be carried out in practice. A more pragmatic 
and practice-oriented policy to guide allocation reform was therefore needed, and 
work on putting together such a guiding document, the Water Allocation Reform 
(WAR) began in 2003. An Expert Panel was put together, consisting of lawyers, 
environmental advisers, representatives from the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF), the Water Research Council and NGOs. However, nobody on 
the Expert Panel had any competence on land issues, as the one person asked 
to join the Panel that could have provided inputs on the land reform process, 
had to opt out due to personal reasons (Movik 2008: 91). Thus, the water reform 
process missed an early opportunity to connect with the land reform process 
and all its internal dynamics (see Hall 2004a: for an overview). The final draft of 
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the policy document was completed in November 2006. A pillar of the WAR was 
the concept of compulsory licensing. The process of drafting a practical policy to 
detail how allocation of rights should be carried out in practice gave ample room 
for particular narratives on how rights should be allocated to emerge. 
In the NWA, the notion of ‘existing lawful uses’ was defined as part of provisions to 
deal with the transition mechanism from the riparian principle to an administered 
authorisation system. Thompson (2006) states that ‘for practical reasons, the 
change could not occur immediately.’ DWAF officials, however, explained the 
retention of ELUs primarily in economic terms. The energetic Director for Water 
Allocations stated how, even though the existing users had greatly benefited 
from skewed landownership and the associated access to water through riparian 
rights, their uses were allowed to carry over  ‘because the economy depends 
on that kind of use’ (interview 31 October 2006). Drafting a policy for how to 
reallocate water would either downplay or strengthen this notion of ELUs, and 
could potentially even ditch the term altogether. In the Water Allocation Reform 
Programme draft dated January 2004, the section on ‘principles to guide water 
allocation’ contains no less than three principles dealing with ELUs, under the 
heading ‘promoting accountable and fair governance.’ The principles are:
• Existing lawful uses will only be curtailed as a last resort and only after all other 
options to find water for the poor and BEE have been exhausted.
• Existing lawful uses of water will not be curtailed unless there are clear 
procedures and support programmes established to promote the productive 
use of water by emerging users.
• No existing lawful consumptive use of water will be completely curtailed. 
In later versions, these three principles are condensed into one:
• It is critical to address equity needs, but attempts to deal with this must be 
balanced with the consideration that many existing lawful water users are 
making productive, efficient and beneficial use and are contributing to socio-
economic stability and growth.  
During the process of crafting allocation reform, two broad views emerged, 
namely the economic productivity perspective, which essentially held that water 
rights should be allocated to the most productive uses in economic terms, and 
the livelihoods perspective that emphasised the need to spread water resources 
more evenly and focus on water’s role as a means to sustain the livelihoods of 
poor people in rural areas, in particular focussing on the potential for reallocating 
water for subsistence agriculture. 
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The economic productivity narrative maintained that existing uses were making 
productive and beneficial use of water and needed to be protected. The productivity 
perspective resonated with the principles of the GEAR macroeconomic policy 
that focussed narrowly on how to stimulate economic growth and promote 
investor confidence. The main message was that redistributing water away from 
ELUs would threaten environmental degradation; Sustainability was therefore 
understood to hinge on the continued practice of ELUs. Consider the following 
excerpt from the first WAR policy document draft: ‘If reallocations occur too 
quickly, the country will suffer economic and environmental damage as emerging 
users struggle to establish productive uses of the reallocated water.’ In particular, 
the second component of the argument, that ‘environmental damage’ will occur 
as ‘emerging users struggle to establish productive use’, posits putative causal 
links (Roe 1991) and implicitly draws on a larger meta-narrative of environmental 
myths (Forsyth 2003; Adger et al. 2001). In this case, the metanarrative is 
the ‘poverty-environment-degradation’ hypothesis, a myth that has gained a 
strong hold on the imagination of both international development agencies and 
policymakers (see Angelsen and Vainio 1998). There is an implicit assumption that 
reallocating to those that are not existing lawful users will result in environmental 
degradation, thus disregarding the potential environmental threat – such as the 
pollution from the mining industry – posed by the consumption levels of existing 
users (see  Duraiappah 1998). 
The phases of the work to craft a Water Allocation Reform generally strengthened 
the productivity discourse. Through ‘privileged accounts’ (Freudenburg 2005), 
existing uses were largely portrayed as productive and ‘beneficial in the public 
interest’, downplaying the negative impacts associated with these uses such as 
inefficiency and pollution, not to mention how water use rights had come to be 
appropriated in the first place; through discriminatory land laws (see Ntsebeza 
2007: for an overview of South Africa’s land politics). The potentially negative 
impact of certain mining enterprises in particular were downplayed (see e.g. 
Limpitlaw et al. 2005).3 The end result of the process was that the existing users 
were entrenched, and the case for redistribution to historically disadvantaged 
individuals (HDIs) was tightly tied to their potential for economic productivity. 
This was reflected in the phrase ‘(...) start people along the journey to becoming 
commercial and competitive users’ that occurs in the final draft, implying that 
potential water users will be judged on their capacity to make economically 
productive use of water.
A corollary of retaining ELUs was that these would have to be accurately determined 
before compulsory licensing could commence, to avoid any accusations of 
3 The threat to water quality by the mining industry has recently led to a storm in South 
Africa’s water circles. Anthony Turton, a former senior researcher at the Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR), was expelled from the institution after publishing a paper 
that brought to the fore the issues of how industry, in particular mining, are threatening to 
degrade the quality of South Africa’s water resources.
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arbitrary reallocation. Any such allegations would render the State liable to go 
through expensive litigation procedures with existing users to establish whether 
or not reallocations were deemed to be ‘fair’. Existing uses, therefore, would have 
to be validated; meaning that the current use had to be accurately quantified, and 
verified, i.e. checking the legal status of the use (whether it was considered as 
lawful under the previous Act). 
The following section will describe the situation in one of the basins designated 
as ‘stressed’, and singled out to be one of the three pilot regions were compulsory 
licensing would be carried out first – the Inkomati Water Management Area 
(WMA) in north-east Mpumalanga (see map 1). A brief overview of the area’s 
history, geography and water management practices is provided, before going on 
to describe the particular perceptions and constellations that characterised this 
area, and how the reform efforts fared. 
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IMPLEMENTING REFORM: DYNAMICS 
AND DISCOURSES IN THE INKOMATI
Map 1. Inkomati Water Management Area
 
While the notion of the need to protect ELUs was gaining ground at the national 
level, the power constellations and discourses emerging at the regional and local 
levels were more complex. In contrast to the national level discourses that tended 
towards pitting HDIs against ELUs, the local-level discourses revolved around 
agriculture versus other users.  
The Inkomati WMA is situated in north-east Mpumalanga, straddling parts 
of the Drakensberg mountain range and the highveld plateau in the west and 
the Lowveld in the east, which is characterised by verdant vegetation and a 
subtropical climate. Rainfall is strongly seasonal and increases along an east-
west gradient, with more than 1,200mm per annum in the mountains and on the 
plateau in the west, to as low as 400mm in the eastern Lowveld area (DWAF 
2004a). Essentially, three independent catchments make up the WMA: the 
Crocodile, the Sabie-Sand, and the Komati. The Komati and Crocodile rivers both 
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originate on the plateau and then flow downwards to feed the Lowveld, which has 
‘some of the most productive and valuable agricultural land in South Africa’ (Bate 
and Tren 2002: 135). The paper focuses on the lower Komati, as this is an area 
of high demand and complexity. 
The area has a turbulent history. When the Boers embarked on what became 
known as the Great Trek (Sparks 2003b; Terreblanche 2002; Morris 1998) in the 
1830s, they arrived to find the area easily occupied as a result of the Difaqane4. 
Parcelling out the fertile land among their kin, the Boers came to settle in what 
they named the Eastern Transvaal, today Mpumalanga. The Boers deepened 
and widened the repressive policies of indirect rule embarked on by the British, 
passing increasingly discriminatory and oppressive laws. The notorious 1913 
Land Act effectively prohibited black Africans from owning land of their own, 
pushing the black peoples into cramped reserves.5 Moreover, their access to 
water was severely restricted as the Land Act, in combination with the 1912 
Irrigation Act, endorsed the principle of riparianism, which essentially meant that 
only the owners of land adjacent to rivers were entitled to use water, and those 
owners were invariably white. After the Second World War and the victory of the 
National Party in 1948, the Government lavished generous subsidies on white 
ex-soldiers to enable them to settle down and farm in the area, which gave rise to 
a ‘...featherbedded and inefficient agricultural industry’ (Sparks 2003b: 133). 
In the Inkomati, the KaNgwane homeland was created to be the ‘home’ of siSwati-
speaking peoples residing outside the borders of Swaziland. This area, about 
320,000km2 in size, accommodated about a million people. Most people living 
in the homeland areas were either engaged in dryland agriculture or were 
migrancy mine workers (King 2005). Some development occurred in terms of 
top-down irrigation schemes and in 1992 a water allocation treaty was forged 
between KaNgwane and South Africa, which saw the lion’s share of the water 
resources being apportioned to the latter. When the ANC government came to 
power in 1994, the old homelands became a thing of the past. But it takes a 
long time to break these structures, and hence the lower Komati area is still a 
very divided society. 
4 Mfacane, alternative spelling mfecane, means ‘the crushing’ in Zulu, whereas Difaqane 
means ‘forced migration’ in Sotho. The Difaqane referred to the widespread Nguni 
conquests in which the powerful Zulu tribe, led by the legendary Shaka, had engaged in 
numerous campaigns to put the land under their control, scattering tribes and peoples. 
The newcomers easily crushed what little resistance they met from an already weakened 
population. See e.g. Morris (1998)
5 In 1952, the Bantu Authorities Act was passed, which effectively made Black South 
Africans aliens in their own land. They were restricted to the reserves, which were 
designated ‘Homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’, and which were destined to become separate, 
independent nations. Since there was little possibility of securing any kind of sustenance 
in these cramped, barren areas, most able-bodied men were forced to migrate and work in 
the mines or towns, and thus were laid the foundations of the labour-migrancy system that 
enabled much of South Africa’s wealth accumulation.
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WATER USERS AND MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURES IN THE INKOMATI 
Water use in the Inkomati include irrigated agriculture, plantation forestry, ESKOM 
– the state energy utility – urban, industrial, mining and domestic use. Brown and 
Woodhouse (2004) note that the reasons for water scarcity are deeply contested, 
a view corroborated by my own observations during fieldwork in the area. There 
was a tendency amongst farmers to lay the blame for scarcity on other upstream 
users, in particular ESKOM, the forestry sector and Swaziland. However, 
commercial agriculture was viewed as the biggest waster by other users, such as 
dryland farmers, urban and domestic uses.  
In terms of management institutions in the area, a new three-tiered structure 
of government took shape after 1994, with provincial government departments 
forming the middle layer between local municipalities and national government. 
The DWAF does not quite conform to the three-tier pattern, as it has no provincial 
department, but rather regional offices within the national sphere, with the 
Regional Office (RO) for the Inkomati WMA based at Nelspruit (Faysse and 
Gumbo 2004). With respect to land affairs, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) 
and Department of Land Affairs (DLA) under the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs have their provincial equivalent in the Mpumalanga Provincial Government 
Department of Agriculture and Land Administration (DALA), which is tasked with 
providing support to all farmers in Mpumalanga. When the administration of 
the homeland of KaNgwane was disbanded in 1994, many of those who were 
employed there were absorbed into DALA. The Inkomati CMA, the first – and 
at the time of fieldwork, only (of 19 proposed) – was established in March 2004, 
after seven years of protracted stakeholder negotiations (Anderson 2005). It 
was officially launched on 2 November 2006, though at the time a number of 
positions had yet to be filled. However, the Governing Board, which is a statutory 
stakeholder platform, has been established and consists of 14 members led by 
a Chief Executive Officer. The Board must meet at least twice annually, and is 
accountable to the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, whilst the individual 
board members should report back to their constituencies. 
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IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE VS. OTHER 
USERS: PATRONAGE, PATERNALISM AND 
CONCEPTIONS OF SUSTAINABILITY
Historically, the political clout of the commercial farming sector stood in stark 
disproportion to its economic importance. Agricultural capital was mainly on white 
hands, and white commercial agriculture had traditionally been a vital political 
constituency of the National Party governments under apartheid (Bate and Tren 
2002), and had built up a strong agricultural union, the Agri South Africa (AgriSA), 
to represent its interests. The black counterpart to the AgriSA, the National African 
Farmers’ Union (NAFU) is neither a particularly large nor powerful interest group. 
Following the demise of apartheid, agriculture was increasinly deregulated, 
signalling the end of a long era of state intervention in a strategically important 
sector. While Vink and Kirsten (2000) argue that deregulation potentially results 
in a net welfare benefit, Hall (2004b) argues that the process causes the gap 
to increase between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and that the State’s emphasis on 
creating a cadre of commercial black farmers ‘sits uneasily with its removal of 
subsidies and other support which have combined to produce a uniquely hostile 
environment for new entrants into agriculture’ (ibid: 220).
Irrigated agriculture is by far the major user in the Lower Komati area, and users 
can be roughly distinguished in terms of large-scale commercial farmers and small-
scale emerging farmers. Whilst the large-scale farmers grow fruits, sugarcane 
and some vegetables, the small-scale farmers are basically involved in sugar-
cane growing through the Government-initiated sugar schemes, known as the 
Nkomazi Irrigation Expansion Programme (Movik 2008; Brown and Woodhouse 
2004; Waalevijn 2002). Where the commercial farmers’ water use rights were 
acknowledged in the Act as existing lawful use, the emerging farmers status was 
uncertain as the 1992 KaNgwane-RSA treaty which had allocated them the water 
ceased to be valid once the homelands were abolished at the onset of democratic 
rule. The principle of riparianism did not apply in the homelands, as most land was 
under chiefly authority and not individually owned, but gained access to through 
Permission to Occupy – see e.g. Hall (2004a) for an overview of land issues in 
the former homeland areas, and the status of reform efforts.  
The commercial sugar farmers had a good deal of flexibility in that they did not 
depend solely on sugar for their income, but diversified into bananas, citrus and 
other crops as well. They also enjoyed a high degree of ‘hydrological security’ in 
that they were able to store river water, in addition to catchment flows and storm 
water, for use during the drier months when irrigation was restricted. The ‘emerging’ 
farmers that formed part of the Nkomazi Irrigation Expansion Scheme did not 
enjoy the same level of flexibility. The NIEP was initiated in the 1990s by the then 
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KaNgwane Administration to promote small-scale farming by black farmers.6 The 
emphasis was squarely on sugarcane, with some additional vegetable projects 
for subsistence purposes. Sugar was chosen primarily because it was considered 
to be a very easy crop for small-scale farmers to grow; there was also a strong 
support system and guaranteed market providing a dependable income (Head of 
Technical Support Services at DALA interview 23 June 2006). The projects were 
developed in two phases, the first initially aiming to support some 950 farmers 
on about 7,000 ha, with an average size of seven ha per individual plot (TSB 
staff interview 8 June 2006). In 2000, a second phase was made possible 
with grants from the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)7 
scheme. This second phase became known as ‘the seven’, but these were 
developed on marginal soils. 
Many of the schemes were struggling at the time of fieldwork. An evaluation report 
on the projects noted that though initially most of the farmers were able to make 
enough money to raise their standard of living and boost the economy, it didn’t 
take long before ratoon age increased, yields declined, and soils were depleted. 
Input costs increased and the sugar price stagnated and even reduced [sic] in 
real terms (Swart 2006: 2). A contributing factor to the falling levels of productivity 
was, according to the extension officer, the system of land access. During the 
apartheid era, chiefs often became puppets of the apartheid regime, which built 
on the ‘indirect rule’ policy of the British (Mamdani 1996). Chiefs amenable to 
the government line were placed in charge of tribal areas, where they acted 
as ‘clenched fists’, with few of the traditional trappings that used to function as 
checks and balances to chiefly power, such as councils (Levin and Mkhabela 
1997). This situation led to the chiefs having little credibility in some areas, and 
traditional leaders were often treated with disdain, in part due to their linkages with 
the apartheid government. After the transition, the ANC vacillated with respect to 
the role of the chiefs, and coalitions were formed with what were regarded as 
‘progressive chiefs’ in several homelands, amongst them the KaNgwane (Levin 
and Mkhabela 1997). However, land access in many areas still depended to a 
large degree on chiefly authority (Claassens 2005; Cliffe 2004; Ashley et al. 2003; 
Lahiff 2003; Ntsebeza 2000), and there were indications that individuals were 
gaining access to the NIEP scheme not on the basis of their farming skills, but on 
the basis of their relationship with the chiefs (Movik 2008; King 2005).
Nevertheless, there was a feeling among many of the farmers and extension 
officers that ‘we need to keep this thing together’ (extension officer interview 
6 Which was facilitated in part by the decision to build the Driekoppies and Maguga dams 
(Brown and Woodhouse 2004).
7 LRAD was initiated by Thoko Didiza in 2001, shelving the former Settlement/Land 
Acquisition Grant (SLAG) programme. The LRAD scheme provides an initial R 20,000 grant 
on a sliding scale and has been criticised for moving away from the pro-poor focus of the 
SLAG programme to align with GEAR policy of emphasising entrepreneurship; favouring 
those with capital.
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25 May 2006). The farmers viewed agriculture – including ‘emerging’ agriculture 
– as the backbone sustaining the community in the region, and something 
that needed to be upheld in order to maintain social stability, though they were 
loth to share any of their own water with the emerging farmers. The emerging 
sugar projects were generally viewed favourably in the media and national policy 
circles. From the point of view of the actors participating in the water allocation 
reform process, the sugar projects in the Inkomati were seen as backing up 
their ideas about promoting ‘productive’ and ‘efficient use’ of water for historically 
disadvantaged uses. 
Hence farmers - both commercial and emerging – came to be pitted against other 
water users. Stealing water from the local municipality supply pipelines to irrigate 
sugarcane was not uncommon among emerging sugar farmers, according to a 
senior engineer at the municipality (interview 26 September 2006). Moreover, 
the CMA representative for domestic users told us how many people, women 
in particular, resented the sugarcane farmers’ water use. ‘You see, the sugar 
farmers, both the commercial and the emerging, they are taking all the water from 
us…It’s a problem’ (interview 23 August 2006). 
The local municipality had approached the Regional Office to ask for their help in 
augmenting water supply, but had been told that if they wanted more water, they 
would have to trade with other sectors. In the words of the Deputy Director of the 
Regional Office, ‘the municipalities are very reluctant to buy water; they want us 
to give them the water. But we can’t just take water from other sectors (…) we 
can’t do it’ (interview 8 September 2006). Though informal trading took place 
within the agricultural sector, there was little evidence of trade between sectors. 
However, DALA did not entertain any thoughts of engaging in intersectoral trade 
in water. A senior official at DALA commented that: 
…they [DWAF and the developers] say we do not stimulate development 
as a department, |because we do not want to give out water…they regard 
us as not stimulating for development. Developers want to buy water from 
agriculture and convert it into primary water use…and when we say “sorry,” 
they then go to the politicians and say that the development is going to generate 
employment and stimulate growth. But agriculture is not giving the water. 
(Interview 23 June 2006)
When asked why they were not interested in trading, he explained that they had 
invested in planning and infrastructure, they had made a great effort in order 
to utilise that water, so now why should they sell it? It was their right, they had 
worked hard for it, and they deserved to hold on to it. This feeling of ‘deserving’ 
to retain water, combined with the perspective that irrigated agriculture was vital 
to uphold the social fabric in the area, led to a situation where it was ‘agriculture 
against the rest’. 
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CURBING AGRICULTURE: ‘THE LITTLE 
MAN AGAINST THE STATE’
Whilst the DALA was intent on supporting agricultural expansion, the DWAF 
Regional Office was determined to curb it. Some of the staff at the Regional 
Office were quite mistrustful of both the emerging farmers and the commercial 
farmers. Whilst the commercial farmers regarded themselves as making efficient 
and beneficial use of water, views at the Regional Office were far less favourable. 
As the Deputy Director put it, ‘the guys are over-irrigating;’ ‘guys’ referring to both 
the large and small-scale farmers. 
The soil is actually decreasing in quality, by over-irrigation. Very few 
farmers want to think about this. They just say ‘give me water’…if we 
can cut twenty per cent of agriculture, it makes a huge difference. In 
a drought period, the crops won’t drop the same way the water drops. 
If water drops by forty per cent, the crops only drop by ten per cent. 
(Deputy Director, interview 8 September 2006)
The stance of the Regional Office was clear: the desire to curb agricultural water 
use; and compulsory licensing was regarded as the primary means of achieving 
this aim. In the Deputy Director’s words: ‘Don’t look to agriculture as your saviour. 
They should start building more factories…we are exporting too much raw material, 
and importing too much processed goods (…) Compulsory licensing will be a 
way to cut down agriculture’ (interview 8 September 2006). The view emanating 
from the Regional Office that farmers should be curbed via compulsory licensing 
and lowering assurance of supply effectively basketed emerging farmers and 
commercial farmers into one category as ‘wasteful’ and ‘inefficient’.
The commercial farmers were increasingly viewing themselves as victimised. 
According to an attorney specialising on water issues who worked in the area:
(...) the main problem is that we are not able to get a licence out of DWAF (…) 
my clients go bankrupt while they are waiting for a licence. It is taking them 
years – four years in one case – to process applications. That is unacceptable. 
Now, what is reasonable for an application is about three months; that is 
what would be normal for a moderately complicated case. I don’t really 
want to, but now I am advising my clients that they should start claiming 
damages for lost yields, etc., after three months (…) There are thousands 
of illegal developments going on, because you cannot get permission. 
Between the man on the ground and the policymaker, there is a huge gap. 
(Interview 7 June 2006)
The attorney observed that many of the commercial farmers in their appeals 
noted that when farmers appealed against DWAF’s decisions, the judges tended 
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to be largely sympathetic towards the farmers and rule in their favour because, 
as she explained to us, to the judges the appeals represented the struggle of the 
‘little man’ against the State. As the judiciary, it was part of their remit to function 
as a check on the State’s power and supposedly, they were fulfilling this role in 
helping the appellants win their cases. 
Thus, the fault lines ran between agriculture and non-agricultural interests, with 
the commercial farmers increasingly viewing themselves as victimised, drawing 
upon images of the ‘little man against the State.’ This was in contrast to the 
fault lines created at the national level, which mainly revolved around narratives 
based on the benefits of retaining ELUs. At the local level, discourses and access 
routes were much more fragmented and dynamic. Nevertheless, the retention of 
ELUs implied that these had to be accurately determined before the process of 
compulsory licensing could go ahead. 
PREPARING FOR COMPULSORY 
LICENSING IN THE INKOMATI
Scientists are very eager to quantify, to get figures, black and white 
statistics…but water itself refuses to be accurately regulated, because 
you cannot predict water. It is very unpredictable. But scientists 
want to analyse, they want figures, they want to be able to say here 
there is a use of three litres per day, etc. You can’t manage water like 
that…they think that we need regulation to the final and last drop. 
(Legal practitioner in Inkomati, interview 4 August 2006)
As a necessary corollary of retaining ELUs, a validation and verification project 
had to be undertaken prior to implementing compulsory licensing. The first part 
of the project, concentrating on the validation of existing water use in the Olifants 
(the neighbouring WMA) and Inkomati WMAs, started in early 2003 and was 
completed in June 2006. Validation entailed confirming how much water the user 
was actually using in the qualifying period, how much they said they were using (or 
registered), as well as how much they were currently using. Verification determines 
the extent of existing lawful water use, but the terms caused much conceptual 
confusion and misunderstandings. In effect, verification should determine if any 
previous laws would have limited the use in the qualifying period.8 If not, the use 
in the qualifying period is lawful. 
8 The qualifying period was defined as the two years prior to the promulgation of the National 
Water Act 1998.
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Validation of water use was carried out through combining modelling approaches, 
LANDSAT and cadastral data, field visits and telephone interviews. Since 
historical water use was rarely measured, determining use in the qualifying period 
represented the most challenging element of the project, and plenty of problems 
were encountered. The SAPWAT model used to estimate water abstractions 
basically provides estimates of crop-water requirements. Results generated 
by SAPWAT vary greatly depending on the quality of the information attributes 
it is fed - crop characteristics, crop requirements, crop type, planting dates, 
soil type, infrastructure, irrigation practice, slope gradient, etc. - and the 
variable interpretation of operators. Even estimates of the model’s error margins 
differ substantially.9 
Farmers were often quite unwilling to provide data to project members, or at least 
the type of information asked for: 
They wanted to know everything in detail, e.g. how many mangoes 
you grow, etc. Thing is, I’m not necessarily going to stick to that 
specific regime what they asked about at that specific point in time 
– things are going to change. The lady [the project leader] was sweet 
enough, but they wanted very specific data, very accurate data. 
(Commercial farmer, Lomati River, interview 24 May 2006)
From the commercial farmers’ point of view, the project was too engrossed in its 
own ideas of scientific detail to be of any relevance. Science was regarded by 
those affected by it as an ‘illegitimate and exploitative set of discursive practices’ 
(Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002; in Haas 2004: 571). 
With regard to verifying water use – i.e. confirming whether a specific water 
use was lawful or not – the nature and history of land transactions served to 
render this exercise fraught with problems, as the dynamics of continuous land 
transactions influenced the legal status of water rights. Where land had been 
subdivided, it was often not possible to determine to which plot the riparian water 
right was now attached; similarly with consolidations. The dilemmas inherent 
in using a relatively static database to mirror dynamic land relationships have 
been extensively documented in research on land titling efforts across Africa 
(see e.g. Benjaminsen and Lund 2003), but the implications for water rights have 
seldom been explored. In addition to land dynamics, informal trade in water rights 
contributed to complicating the picture. According to the previous legislation – the 
1956 Act – users were permitted to trade riparian rights as they saw fit, but not 
rights attenuated through Government-issued permits or quotas. Illicit trade had 
nonetheless taken place with the covert consent of local Irrigation Boards (Bate 
and Tren 2002). Another aspect of the need to attach water rights to land was the 
9 One internal DWAF source reports SAPWAT as having an error margin of up to 40 per 
cent, whereas others quote figures as high as 60 per cent (DWAF internal memo 2006).
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uncertain nature of land tenure in former homeland areas.  These factors led to 
the rather disheartening result, for DWAF, that in only about 17 per cent of the 
cases could the project team determine water use as ‘possibly lawful’. Further 
work was needed in terms of verifying water use, and the project was tendered 
to a different group of consultants. However, their contract was not extended, 
and DWAF is currently (as of February 2009) considering scrapping the whole 
verification project as it is too costly and resource-intensive.  
Since SAPWAT was so inaccurate, DWAF realised that ‘it will be very difficult 
to prove a water use that exceeds the allocated verified volume in a court (or 
Tribunal) with the presently available mechanisms and legal framework in the 
NWA’ (DWAF internal source). Garduño and Hinsch (2005) point out that the 
support of compulsory licensing requires much more sophisticated modelling 
techniques, and it would take 10 consulting teams approximately 20 years to 
complete. Interestingly, the proposed way out of this dilemma was to argue that 
unlawful use was inefficient (DWAF internal note): 
If users may have registered more than the SAPWAT requirement, [they] 
may argue that they used more [than] this during the qualification period. 
As it may be difficult to prove that this was not the case (and hence to 
prove this use as unlawful), the use could be flagged as inefficient and be 
considered as such during the compulsory licensing process. 
Thus, the early discourses of existing lawful use as ‘efficient and beneficial’ are 
now undergoing scrutiny. The failure of the State to curb unlawful use is, in a 
sense, closing the circle. Since they are not technically or scientifically able to pin 
down unlawful use, the ‘weapon’ resorted to is again a discursive one, in labelling 
users as ‘inefficient.’ 
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IMPASSE 
DWAF was increasingly realising the shortcomings of the scientific approach 
to determining lawful use, and beginning to outline alternative means of coping 
with this, through e.g. labelling existing users as ‘inefficient’ (in direct contrast 
to the earlier focus on ELUs as efficient and productive). The people within the 
Directorate for Water Allocations were growing impatient in terms of providing 
water to the HDIs; they wanted to speed up the reform process and needed to 
find new ways of doing so in light of the increasing difficulties. 
One possible pathway that emerged was to develop further the notion of General 
Authorisations (GAs). GAs were one of the four categories of use rights defined 
in the Act. However, at that time, it was viewed primarily as a means of lessening 
the administrative burden associated with licensing, and intended for use in 
unstressed catchments that did not yet need to go through the compulsory 
licensing process. But as the water allocation reform dragged on into its seventh 
year without much progress, the idea of developing GAs as a tool to be integrated 
into the compulsory licensing process slowly formed, although opinions on its 
potential differed within DWAF. Nevertheless, a team of consultants was asked 
to develop the idea further, and in November 2005 an inception workshop was 
held for interested stakeholders.10 GAs were seen as sitting in the ‘grey area’ 
between Schedule One users - water for small-scale domestic use and non-
commercial purposes - and licences, which were viewed as providing access to 
water for commercial purposes. The view that emerged at the inception workshop 
was that GAs should be reserved for small-scale use by people with their own 
abstraction technologies, and that water should be allocated primarily to users 
that were able to take up the water and use it productively, not simply because 
the users were HDIs. There was no mention of infrastructure in terms of enabling 
access to water for HDIs. The consultants had been asked to prepare fictitious 
case studies to illustrate the potential benefits and drawbacks of GAs. The DFID 
consultant stated that the case studies did not need to ‘actually work in practice’ 
but were ‘useful in understanding the approach outlined in the methodologies.’ 
Whilst this may be the case, it strengthened the impression of ‘centralised’ and 
rather abstract knowledge-making. 
The then Deputy Director at the Inkomati Regional Office pointed out that 
prioritisation of GAs would become a problem, stating that ‘[the] scary thought 
about GAs is that this one guy can get as much as he likes, but not that other…
Who do you give it [the water] to?’ (interview 8 September 2006). He continued:
10 The stakeholders comprised the regional directors, as well as representatives from other 
interests, such as IWMI and officers from the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs 
and various financial institutions.
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It’s a nice idea (…) but I’m very scared of the term ‘General Authorisations’. 
It implies that you don’t need control. If five per cent of the water 
[is] set aside for General Authorisations and you don’t monitor it, you 
don’t authorise it, you don’t keep records of it (…) it means you don’t 
have control.
He noted that there was a study underway to assess the water availability in the 
system, which was planned to take about two years, and added:
…if the politicians say they can’t wait to reallocate, then there’s going 
to be a huge risk. I have a major problem with that. To do [compulsory 
licensing], without having all the data is very risky. You cannot reallocate 
without the necessary information. They haven’t even set the international 
requirements yet.
At a meeting some weeks later with the then Director, Water Allocation at DWAF; 
he observed that: 
Hydrologists, modellers, they want great detail; you can’t, 
you’ve got to take some risk (…) It takes them too long (…) How 
much should you study a system before making a decision? 
(Director, Water Allocations, interview 31 October 2006) 
The above quote succinctly sums up the crux of the situation, the perception 
of uncertainty and risk, and the continuous attempts of the modellers and 
hydrologists to reduce, if not eliminate, uncertainty, and the differing perceptions 
of risk and need for control.
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UNDERSTANDING WATER REFORM: ALLOCATION 
DISCOURSES, DYNAMICS AND UNCERTAINTY
The paper started out by highlighting how perceptions of scarcity have triggered 
reform efforts across the globe, emphasising the trend of bringing water resources 
under the ambit of the State and highlighting the fact that policies often tend to 
ignore and downplay dynamics and incertitude. A main point was that, in the shift 
from a riparian to a licence-based system of water allocation, the onus is now on 
the State to flesh out conceptions of use rights and to justify particular allocation 
mechanisms – the shift towards greater state authority provided a fertile ground 
for the emergence of particular narratives with respect to who should have rights 
to water. Water policy reform is not simply a tabulated, neutralised exercise of 
applying certain given principles, but a protracted struggle for meaning; policy 
disourse itself actively shapes use rights (Movik 2008). This notion builds on 
the idea of rights as social relations, i.e. that use rights are constituted through 
the social recognition of certain claims and categories over others. Eggertsson 
(1996: 157) argues that property rights, as all social phenomena, ‘abstract from 
the real world by stylising select characteristics of human behaviour, organisation, 
and physical environments’. It is the nature of this ‘stylising’ that is of interest, 
how it gives rise to certain narratives, and how the forging of particular subject 
positionings  (Fischer 2003; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Fairclough 1995) in policy 
narratives define certain categories’ relations vis-à-vis each other and the resource. 
Fairclough (1995), drawing on Willig (2001) states that a systematic exploration is 
required of how discursive constructions open up particular pathways for action.
Through the exercise of categorising water uses, users are created correspondingly 
– subjects have been created in the process of transformation, being invented and 
reinvented. Where before there were only irrigators, the National Water Act has 
created a host of new categories and correspondent subject positionings: stream 
flow reducers, ELUs, HDIs, potential water users, etc. The water allocation reform 
largely revolves around these main categories, that of ELUs and that of HDIs, 
with an additional category of the ‘commercial HDI’. The notion of ELUs was 
formed through the process of creating a ‘chain of equivalence,’ i.e. emphasising 
what is equal, what is held in common, by a diversity of actors (Laclau 1996). 
This creates an ‘equivalential chain’, in which disparate identities are collapsed 
in order to serve a particular purpose. In Laclau’s words, ‘the more the chain 
expands, the more differential features of each of the links will have to be dropped 
in order to keep alive what the equivalential chain attempts to express’ (ibid: 
208). The equivalential chain, in this instance, is all the different water users: 
mining, agriculture, industry, domestic, urban; these are all collapsed into the 
basket term ‘existing lawful uses’, converting of possible subject positionings into 
a monopolising dichotomy of existing lawful and historically disadvantaged.   
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Discourse, according to MacDonald, can be regarded as form of ‘ideological 
practice’ (MacDonald 2003: 153), in the sense that it contributes to construing 
certain goals and system functionings as more worthy or sustainable than others, 
and this process of construction will be deeply influenced by the pevailing political 
terrain. Similarly, the notion of subject positionings hinges on the idea that the 
construction of the subject in discourse is inherently political, asserting the 
primacy of politics in terms of determining subjects and their relations. 
Understanding how these discourses and subject positioning emerges, then, 
requires the teasing out of the wider socio-historical and political setting. The 
legacy of inequality left by apartheid laid the ground for the focus on redress and 
redistribution, but the nature of what became known as the ‘negotiated settlement’ 
under the transition, where the ANC was thought to reach a compromise with 
powerful economic interests in order to secure political power, paved the way 
for the rise of the neoliberal paradigm in much of postapartheid politics. This 
paradigm influenced in various ways the water reform, as for example in the 
heavy emphasis placed on the role of water for economic productivity and the 
recognition of ELUs, justified through the fear of disrupting the economy. It is 
also reflected in the emphasis on the notion that those who had been wronged 
in the past should be given access to water, but with the general ideal that they 
should become commercial and economically productive users of water. What 
this does, is to tie a tight knot between the constitutional claims of HDIs to greater 
access to water and their capacity for productive use. Greater equity can thus 
only be achieved through either HDIs gaining capacity to use water productively, 
or by getting access to ‘benefits accruing from water’ through being employed by 
someone who uses water productively. Through the emphasis on scarcity and 
making efficient use of scarce resources, the notion of redistribution is hinged on 
the capacity to use water efficiently. Even if this rendition may seem self-evident 
at first, it arises out of particular framings of social and ecological dynamics, 
which in turn point to equally self-evident solutions. By questioning the manner in 
which the problem is framed in the first instance, this also opens up the ‘closure’ 
(Stirling 2005; Fischer 2003) achieved in terms of advocating a particular solution. 
Through the privileged account of ELUs as beneficial and productive, then, the 
orientation of the problem effectively obscures from view the fact that large-scale 
supply schemes serving mining and agricultural interests and the huge subsidies 
lavished on the agricultural sector contributed to wasteful and inefficient use.
Such privileged accounts arose out of, and were nurtured by, the prevailing 
political economy conditions. In particular, the emphasis on the notion of ‘two 
economies’served to portray the commercial sectors as the modern engine of 
economic growth, which the ‘traditional’ sectors needed to be integrated into, 
The BBBEE policy further contributed to reinforcing the legitimacy of this view, in 
terms of providing blacks access to the benefits of economic growth occurring in 
the ‘modern’ sector. This was particularly true with respect to the mining sector. 
The ubiquitous notion of the ‘two economies’ and the need to integrate the 
traditional sector into the commercial one also explains much of the emphasis on 
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HDIs making commercial use of water in the water allocation reform, defining the 
problem narrowly as one of scarcity and how to distribute scarce resources. This 
framing of the problem, coupled with the nature of the ‘negotiated settlement’, 
which in effect preserved colonial land grabs by constitutional sanction (Hendricks 
and Ntsebeza 2000), provided the rules of formation for the discourse on existing 
users as making beneficial and productive use. Francis (2005: 15), drawing 
on John Pilger,11 notes that ‘the prevailing political rhetoric, which placed an 
emphasis on the reallocation of land, water, and other natural resources to the 
people, was merely expedient during the decades of struggle for liberation and 
the early years of democratic transition.’ Hence, property was protected through 
the ‘existing lawful use’ category. The issuing of licences was made conditional 
on the productive capacity of new entrants. Retaining ELUs also meant that such 
users would have to be accurately determined before compulsory licensing could 
begin an issue which was to bedevil the whole reform process.
The subject positionings created at the national level did not resonate in the 
Inkomati. Rather the situation was a more fragmented and dynamic one, with 
the emergence of an alliance between the established commercial farmers and 
the emerging farmers characterised by patronage and paternalism. Rather than 
existing lawful users pitted against historically disadvantaged individuals, it was 
the agricultural interests pitted against other sectors in competition for water, with 
access to irrigated agriculture for emerging farmers shaped by land dynamics. 
Moreover, whilst agriculture viewed other sectors as culprits in terms of creating 
water scarcity, others, such as e.g. domestic users, viewed the commercial 
agricultural sector, comprising both the commercial and emerging farmers, as 
the big wasters.  Again, an understanding of the historical trajectory and political 
context is key to appreciating the particular positions and constellations that were 
present in the Inkomati, in particular the role played by traditional authorities and 
the strong position of commercial farmers. 
Though the economic productivity perspective spurned commercial agriculture 
for its perceived marginal contributions to the economy, and the livelihoods 
perspective concentrated on the notion of ‘emerging’ in terms of agriculture, 
viewing it more as a route to emancipation, the particular political economic 
conditions prevailing at the time, which saw the protection of property rights as 
key to gaining investor confidence, meant that the agricultural lobby was indirectly 
favoured by the reform’s insistence on retaining the notion of existing lawful use. 
This points to another feature, namely the tendency wherein issues of a political 
nature come to be ‘bureaucratised’ and how technical and ‘self-evident’ terms 
– such as ’Existing Lawful Use’ _ come to cloud the inherent political decision-
making. The emphasis on registering all water users over and above Schedule 
One, and then embarking on the project of validating and verifying such use 
had more to do with a desire to gain control over the resource and its uses than 
with facilitating redistribution. 
11 World-renowned Australian journalist, author and documentary film-maker
28
The State effectively tripped itself up with the retention of ELUs and the reliance on 
scientific certitude to determine unlawful use that ignored dynamics. As Scoones 
et al. (2007) have pointed out; uncertainty is inherent to dynamic systems. The 
problem is that policy does not deal with it head-on, but implicitly assumes some 
sort of equilibrium state. These contestations in terms of the inability of the 
scientific and technological expertise to determine use rights led to an impasse in 
terms of redistribution efforts. After long delays, there is currently talk of scrapping 
the whole process of verification, and changing the Act to enable reallocation to 
go ahead without having to determine the extent of lawful use. Currently, the water 
legislation is under review, with an aim to getting rid of the cumbersome validation 
and verification process, and to find better and easier ways of providing water to 
those hitherto excluded from access (Ndileka Mohapi, interview 5 February 2009). 
The process of reviewing the legal foundations for water reform will likely take 
at least another year (Charles M’Marete, Director Water Allocations, interview 4 
February 2009), and major revisions of the institutional set-up are also underway. 
There is, on the whole, a feeling that the approach to reform the current water 
allocation has been too centralised and technocratic, and there is a shortage of 
capacity to implement it. 
Hopefully, this will entail greater focus on the dynamics at work on the ground and 
closer collaboration with the land reform processes. The ousting of Mbeki and the 
recent inaguration of Jacob Zuma as the country’s new president will open up new 
spaces for potential radical policy change. But the uncertainty and infighting that 
has beset the ANC for several years will likely not go away anytime soon. Though 
Zuma enjoys wide support among the grassroots of the ANC, who have been 
increasingly alienated by Mbeki’s aloofness, the charges of corruption and rape 
that have been levied against him means that his aptitude for the highest office of 
the country is doubtful – a fact that serves to create a climate of uncertainty and 
apprehensiveness about the country’s future. It will, therefore, be very interesting 
to see what will happen in terms of a shake-up of the legislation and institutional 
set-up, and how the interactions of ecological, social and technological systems 
in the context of water resources will be reframed. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND WIDER IMPLICATIONS
Drawing together the main issues of the water allocation reform, it is possible 
to argue that the initial emphasis on equity early on in the reform process came 
to increasingly shift towards a concern with control. I claim that this shift is best 
understood if one regards property rights as constituted not only through social 
relations and material characteristics, but also through discourse. The basis of 
this argument is the contention that the shift from the riparian system of water 
use to formal licences was akin to a shift in emphasis from individual acquisition 
to state authorisation. This shift from individual to state authority, which occurred 
with the introduction of licences in the National Water Act, permitted policy actors 
to engage in competitive story-telling in terms of vesting the idea of use rights and 
licences with particular meanings.
Though the allocation of water resources in the South African context was initially 
explicitly political – with the aim of bringing about a more equitable distribution 
– the process of allocation reform ended up couching inherently political issues 
in innocuous sounding and neutralising terms such as existing lawful use. This 
is the risk in other settings as well, that questions of water allocation that were 
previously founded on more or less easy-to-define legal principles, are now 
subject to state deliberations through the issuing of state-authorised licences or 
permits. Even if seemingly objective criteria are deployed to aid decision-making 
in favour or disfavour of any given individual applicant or group for a water use 
right, these criteria are liable to be deeply influenced by the particular political 
economy context and the associated discourses that emerge. Over time, this 
influence is likely to be camouflaged in technical or legal language, and may 
mask inherently political decisions as purely technical or bureaucratic ones. 
It is, therefore, necessary to be aware of the way that the policy process can 
contribute to obscuring the power constellations present in particular narratives 
around rights and rights holders.
In addition, by providing the State the authority to issue use rights, the onus of 
defining the content of such rights is also placed on the State. In situations where 
government capacity is stretched to the limits, as is the case in many developing 
countries, this may be an almost insurmountable task and a questionable use 
of government resources. Even in developed country settings the process of 
attempting to accurately quantify the portion of a resource to which a user holds 
rights is fraught with problems. The tendency towards rigid determination of use 
rights is undermined by the presence of incertitude, which further renders the 
task of backing legal claims with reference to scientific quantification moot. The 
difficulties in terms of quantifying and legally backing up state-authorised use rights, 
then, seriously bring into question their merit. Finding ways to deal with incertitude 
would likely provide a more fruitful pathway to managing water resources than 
sticking with the current pattern of attempting accurate quantifications. 
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These observations open up broader questions about state-citizen relations. 
Implementing IWRM and institutionalising use rights ultimately concerns issues 
of state versus citizen authority over resources, and how that authority is 
negotiated. This insight implies that attempts to implement permit or licensing 
systems in different contexts needs to be explicit regarding the political nature 
of such reform efforts, rather than treat them as purely technical or management 
exercises. There is, then, a need to raise awareness in terms of the ways in 
which discourses arise, and how language at the policy level is deployed in such 
a manner that it contributes to fashioning property relations and to make sure 
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